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THE JOURNAL OF 
APPELLATE PRACTICE 
AND PROCESS 
ESSAYS 
THE SUPREME COURT—THEN AND NOW 
Jon O. Newman* 
The modern Supreme Court differs in significant ways 
from the Court I knew more than sixty years ago as senior law 
clerk to Chief Justice Earl Warren during the 1957 Term.1 I 
propose to compare the 1957 Court to the 2014 Court, focusing 
not on doctrinal shifts but on institutional matters and internal 
practices. I select 2014 to precede the death of Justice Scalia in 
2015, which left an eight-member Court during half of that year 
and most of 2016. 
I turn first to the Justices’ law clerks. In 1957, most of the 
clerks came to the Court right after graduating from law school. 
*Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Thanks to Jeffrey 
Minear, Counselor to Chief Justice Roberts, for useful information, and to Dallin Oaks, one 
of my co-clerks at the Supreme Court, Earl Pollock and Bill Dempsey, law clerks for Chief 
Justice Warren shortly before and after my clerkship, and Amy Mason Saharia, law clerk 
for Justice Sotomayor during the 2010 Term, for their helpful comments.  
1. Since 1916, the Court’s Term has begun on the first Monday in October, see An Act 
to Amend the Judicial Code; to Fix the Time When the Annual Term of the Supreme Court 
Shall Commence; and Further to Define the Jurisdiction of That Court, Pub. L. No. 258, 
§ 230, 39 Stat. 726, 726 (1916) (now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2 (2018)), and for many years 
ended when the Court recessed for the summer, usually in June, although with occasional 
special Terms thereafter. In 1990, the Court amended its rules to provide that its Term is 
“continuous,” Sup. Ct. R. 3 (1990), and made a further amendment in 1995 to provide that 
the continuous Term ends on the day before the first Monday in October of the following 
year, Sup. Ct. R. 3 (1995). 
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2 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
Only three (two for Justice Harlan, one for Chief Justice 
Warren) had previously clerked for a year at a federal court of 
appeals. In 2014, all the law clerks had previously worked for a 
court of appeals judge.
The first law clerk came to the Court in 1882, but the 
practice was not institutionalized until several years later.2
Justices Holmes and Brandeis were the first to hire a recent law 
school graduate as the one law clerk each was then allotted. 
Law clerks, then and now, assist a Supreme Court Justice in 
three general ways, but some aspects of their work have 
changed. The clerks write brief memos on the thousands of 
certiorari (cert.) petitions asking the Court to review decisions of 
the thirteen federal courts of appeals and the fifty state supreme 
courts. Law clerks also write long memos analyzing each case 
that the Court has accepted for argument. Sometimes law clerks 
draft opinions and usually edit drafts that their Justice has 
prepared and give suggestions for improving draft opinions from 
other Justices. Law clerks serve for one year, although in the 
Court’s early years, some served for several years, a few for the 
lifetime of their Justice.3
That first task of writing memos on cert. petitions has 
changed. In 1957, the clerks in the chambers of each Justice 
(except Justice Frankfurter, who read all petitions himself4)
wrote cert. memos for their Justice. By 2014, a so-called “cert. 
pool” had been formed.5 The cert. petitions are divided among 
the law clerks for all the Justices participating in the pool, and 
each clerk writes for the Justices in the pool a memo on his or 
her assigned petitions. The cert. pool started in 1972 with five 
Justices participating.6 In some years as many as eight Justices 
were in the pool. 
2. See Chester A. Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law 
Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 299, 301 (1961). 
3. See STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 38 (10th ed. 2013). 
4. See ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES—100 YEARS 
OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 115 (2006). The authors report 
that Justice Brennan “largely reviewed cert. petitions himself.” Id.
5. See H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 41–49 (1991). 
6. WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 4, at 119 (noting that Chief Justice Burger and Justices 
Powell, Rehnquist, White, and Blackmun joined the original pool).
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THE SUPREME COURT—THEN AND NOW 3
I think the cert. pool is an unfortunate development. The 
Justices are better served when each receives a cert. memo 
prepared by his or her own law clerks. When nine law clerks 
prepare cert. memos on each petition, there’s a better chance at 
least one of them will identify a petition that really should be 
granted. In some chambers, law clerks give their Justice 
comments on cert. pool memos. Perhaps the cert. pool is an 
inevitable consequence of the huge increase in the number of 
cert. petitions. 
In 1957, there were just eighteen law clerks. Seven Justices 
had two, Justice Douglas had one, and the Chief Justice had 
three. In 2014, each Justice had four clerks for a total of thirty-
six.7 The reason Warren had three clerks in 1957 was our 
primitive technology. There were no Xerox machines or other 
means for quickly reproducing copies of documents. When 
people without lawyers asked the Supreme Court to review their 
cases, they usually filed just one copy of the cert. petition, often 
handwritten.8 Most of these pro se petitioners were prisoners 
challenging either their convictions or the conditions of their 
confinement. 
With that one copy from the pro se, the law clerks for the 
Chief Justice prepared a short memo—usually two or three 
pages—for all nine Justices of the Court.9 We made copies of 
our memos by typing them on carbon sets with eight sheets of 
carbon paper between nine pages of tissue paper. Our memos 
were appropriately called “flimsies.” The ninth copy was barely 
legible. In 2014, cert. memos in pro se cases were prepared by 
the cert. pool. 
One day during my clerkship, Justice Frankfurter, who had 
a rather strained relationship with Chief Justice Warren, stopped 
me in the hallway on the way to my office and told me he 
wanted me to come with him to his chambers to discuss one of 
7. The number of law clerks for each Justice increased from one to two in 1947, see 
SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 38 n.82, from two to three in 1970, and from three to four in 
1974, see WARD & WEIDEN, supra note 4, at 45. 
8. Those who could not afford filing fees were permitted to file one copy of their 
papers. Sup. Ct. R. 53(1), (2) (1954). Currently, they are required to file an original and ten 
copies, Sup. Ct. R. 39 (2) (2013), although inmates confined to an institution may file just 
the original, id.
9. The practice of having the Chief Justice’s chambers initially consider pro se cert. 
petitions began with Chief Justice Stone. See Newland, supra note 2, at 304. 
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4 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
the pro se cert. memos I had written. “That is,” he added with a 
twinkle in his eye, “unless you’re quarantined from my 
chambers.” On another occasion, when I had used a colloquial 
term in a memo, Justice Frankfurter sent me a note stating, “You 
have permitted the gaiety of conversation to intrude upon the 
permanence of print.” 
The increase in the number of clerks has had one 
consequence not usually reported. Anyone looking at the 
thickness of the books containing opinions of the Supreme Court 
will notice that as the number of law clerks increased over the 
years, so did the number of pages of the Court’s opinions. There 
were not more opinions. In fact there were fewer.10 The opinions 
just got longer.11 Law clerks draft many opinions, and Justices 
often do not take the time to edit them down to an appropriate 
size.12
A few words about my title “senior law clerk,” in later 
years changed to “chief clerk.” The Chief Justice customarily 
bestowed the title on the one of his three clerks who had been a 
law clerk at a court of appeals. Since I had been a law clerk at 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, I got the title. It was 
not a merit designation. The title carried one perk—a large 
office all to myself—and the responsibility for choosing the 
monthly speakers for lunches at the Court with the entire group 
of law clerks. Our drawing power was apparently significant. 
Dean Acheson came. Justice Brennan came. And then there was 
the time I invited a young senator from Massachusetts. The 
other clerks gave me a lot of grief for selecting John F. 
Kennedy, but I assured them this fellow had a big future. 
In 1957 most of the small group of eighteen law clerks had 
lunch together almost every day in a room set aside for that 
purpose. The conversations covered lots of ground, and 
frequently one or more of us would urge the others to take a 
careful look at a cert. petition that we thought was a strong 
10. See infra page 8. 
11. See id.
12. One reported vignette suggests another reason for tolerating long draft opinions 
prepared by law clerks. Once when the concerns of Chief Justice Burger about a majority 
opinion were accommodated by a revision, the Chief Justice nonetheless issued a 
concurring opinion drafted by his law clerk, explaining that to withdraw it “would break 
[the] clerk’s heart.” DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 322 (1990).
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THE SUPREME COURT—THEN AND NOW 5
candidate for Supreme Court review. The law clerks were first 
given a room for lunch during the 1954 Term, after some 
Justices overheard clerks talking about cases in the public 
cafeteria. The 2014 Court had no lunchroom for the clerks, and 
today’s clerks never have lunch together as a full group and 
rarely even in smaller groups. I think that change is a loss, not 
just in collegiality but in opportunities for useful exchanges. 
A final fact about the law clerks. Eight of them have 
become Justices of the Court, including Justice Gorsuch, who is 
the first former law clerk to serve alongside a Justice for whom 
he clerked, Justice Kennedy.13 Justice White clerked for Chief 
Justice Vinson, Justice Stevens clerked for Justice Rutledge, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist clerked for Justice Jackson, Justice 
Breyer clerked for Justice Goldberg, Chief Justice Roberts 
clerked for then-Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kagan clerked for 
Justice Marshall, and Justice Kavanaugh also clerked for Justice 
Kennedy.
I turn now to the Justices themselves—first, their number. 
There were nine in 1957 and nine in 2014. But the number has 
not always been nine. The first Court, appointed by George 
Washington in 1789, had six Justices.14 Congress increased the 
number to seven in 1807, to nine in 1837, and to ten in 1863.15
The size was reduced to nine in 1866, fell to eight in 1868, and 
went back to nine in 1869, where it has remained ever since.16
Although the number of Justices is the same today as it was 
in 1957, there has been a marked change in their backgrounds. 
In 1957 only two, Justices Harlan and Whittaker, had previously 
served on a federal court of appeals; Justice Brennan had served 
on a state supreme court. From 2005 until Justice Kagan came to 
the Court in 2010 after serving as Solicitor General of the 
United States, all nine Justices had been judges on federal courts 
of appeals. And for the twenty-three years from 1991 to 2014, 
there were always at least six Justices who had been judges of 
13. Justice Gorsuch also clerked for Justice White after White retired from the Supreme 
Court and sat with the Tenth Circuit. 
14. The Supreme Court of the United States and the Federal Judiciary, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR. (n.d.), https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/supreme-court-united-states-and-federal-
judiciary.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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federal courts of appeals. There were eight in 2014, and there 
are eight today. 
I think the appointment of so many former federal appellate 
judges is unfortunate, although no one would expect me, of all 
people, to suggest that a federal court of appeals judge would 
not make an admirable member of the Supreme Court. My point 
is that the Court benefits from an array of Justices with varied 
backgrounds, especially political experience. On the 1957 Court, 
Justices Black and Burton had been United States Senators, and 
Chief Justice Warren had been a governor. Justice Clark had 
been the Attorney General of the United States, Justice Douglas 
had been a professor at Yale Law School and chairman of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, and Justice Frankfurter 
had been a professor at Harvard Law School. I should 
acknowledge that on the 2014 Court Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kagan had been full-time professors before their 
appointment, and others had taught part-time.17
 The 1957 Court comprised nine White men.18 Thurgood 
Marshall became the first Black Justice in 1967, and Sandra Day 
O’Connor became the first female Justice in 1981. The Court in 
2014 included one Black Justice and three women. Three 
Justices were Jewish, and six were Catholic. In fact, a 
remarkable feature of the 2014 Court is that no member of the 
Court was a Protestant, a complete change from the Court 
during most of the nineteenth century when all nine Justices 
were Protestant.19
How the Justices were confirmed has significantly 
changed.20 We are now so used to televised hearings of 
nominees before the Senate Judiciary Committee that it is worth 
recalling the earlier practice. No Supreme Court nominee even 
attended a Senate committee hearing until Justice Stone, then the 
17. See Barry Sullivan & Megan Canty, Interruptions in Search of a Purpose: Oral 
Argument in the Supreme Court Terms 1958–60 and 2010–12, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1005, 
1006.
18. I always capitalize “White” and “Black” when referring to Caucasians and African-
Americans. The words connote more than skin color. I began this practice and explained its 
use in one of my early district court opinions, Moss v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 350 F. Supp. 
879, 880 n.2 (D. Conn. 1972).
19. See Sullivan & Canty, supra note 17, at 1007 n.8. 
20. See generally Paul A. Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical 
Perspectives, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1988). 
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Attorney General of the United States, was questioned in 1925.21
The next to attend was Justice Frankfurter, who showed up in 
1939 and briefly answered questions, as did Justice Jackson in 
1941 and Justice Harlan in 1955.22 Extensive grilling began in 
1959 with the nomination of Justice Stewart.23 Of course, it was 
the hearing for Robert Bork in 1987 that significantly changed 
the hearing process, probably forever.24
The rejection of Judge Bork, however, was not the first 
time that the Senate failed to confirm a nominee for the Court. 
Before Bork, rejection was more frequent than is generally 
thought.25 Thirty-six nominations were not confirmed, but this 
represents thirty-one people because some were nominated again, 
and six of those thirty-one were later confirmed. That leaves 
twenty-five people not confirmed, and the Senate’s refusal to hold 
a hearing on President Obama’s 2016 nominee, Merrick Garland, 
increased the number not confirmed to twenty-six.26
The number of cases that the Supreme Court is asked to 
review has been steadily increasing over the years. The 1957 
21. Shortly after Attorney General Stone was nominated to be a Justice, he took the 
unexpected step of convening a grand jury in Washington, D.C., to seek a second federal 
indictment of Montana Senator Burton K. Wheeler, already indicted in Montana. Although 
the Judiciary Committee had unanimously approved his nomination to the Supreme Court, 
the nomination was recommitted. Attorney General Stone testified at a hearing of the 
committee on January 28, 1925, was questioned extensively, and again approved. Stone 
Will Push Action on Wheeler; Sees an Oil Plot, 74 N.Y. TIMES 1 (Jan. 29, 1925) (reporting 
that “the nomination of Mr. Stone as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court has been 
held up because of the criticisms which have been leveled at him,” but also that the 
Judiciary Committee had concluded after questioning him that the nomination “would be 
further considered”); Committee Approves Nomination of Stone; Reports It Out to the 
Senate, Where It Is Likely to Be Confirmed Today, N.Y. TIMES 2 (Feb. 3, 1925).  
22. See, e.g., Paul L. Collins, Jr. & Lori A. Ringhand, 41 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 126, 132 
(2016). 
23. See, e.g., Freund, supra note 20, at 1162 (indicating that Justice Stewart was 
“questioned at length . . . by Senator John McClellan of Arkansas on racial segregation”). 
24. See, e.g., L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 647, 671 (2003) (noting in a review of Mark Tushnet’s THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER that “the Bork hearings changed the nominating process”).
25. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme Court Confirmations, 2010 
SUP. CT. REV. 381, 391 (discussing six nominees rejected on ideological grounds between 
1795 and 1930). 
26. The Senate maintains a complete list of nominees to the Supreme Court. Supreme 
Court Nominations: Present–1789, U.S. SENATE (n.d.), https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/ 
reference/nominations/Nominations.htm. 
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Court was asked to review nearly 1,400 cases27 and granted 
review in 110 cases.28 The 2014 Court was asked to review more 
than 7,000 cases29 and granted review in only sixty-eight 
cases.30 Despite this five-fold increase in the number of requests 
for review, the output of the Court has actually declined. The 
1957 Court decided 117 cases with full opinions.31 The 2014 
Court decided only seventy-six cases with full opinions,32 about 
two-thirds as many as the 1957 Court. Between those years, the 
Court’s output hit a high of 167 cases decided with full opinions 
in the 1981 Term and has declined ever since then.33
Although the number of cases decided has decreased, the 
length of the Court’s opinions has significantly increased. In the 
1950s, the median length of Supreme Court opinions was 2,000 
words.34 In the 2009 Term, the median length was more than 
8,000 words.35 Parkinson’s Law holds: “Work expands to fill the 
time available for its completion.” Apparently the Supreme 
Court has a variation: “Opinions expand to fill the time available 
to write them.” 
27. The exact number was 1,396. Caseloads: Supreme Court of the United States, 
Petitions for Certiorari, 1923–1969, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (n.d.), https://www.fjc.gov/history
/courts/caseloads-supreme-court-united-states-petitions-certiorari-1923-1969.  
28. Statistics—October Term 1957, J. SUP. CT. U.S. at I (n.d.). 
29. The exact number was 7,032. John G. Roberts, Jr., 2015 Year-End Report on the 
Federal Judiciary 13 (Dec. 31, 2015), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/public 
info/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf. 
30. Statistics as of June 30, 2015, J. SUP. CT. U.S. at II (n.d.). 
For a detailed examination of the decline in recent years in the number of cert. 
petitions that the Supreme Court has granted, see David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s 
Declining Plenary Docket: A Membership-Based Explanation, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 151 
(2010). Judge Stras, then a professor at the University of Minnesota Law School, reported 
that changes in Court personnel beginning after the 1989 Term precipitated a decline in the 
numbers of cert. petitions granted. The average number of times that a Justice voted to 
grant plenary review was 129.25 from 1986 to 1989 for Justice Brennan compared to 
eighty-three from 1990 to 1993 for Justice Souter, who replaced him; 124.6 from 1986 to 
1991 for Justice Marshall compared to 71.7 from 1991 to 1993 for Justice Thomas, who 
replaced him; and 215.6 from 1986 to 1992 for Justice White compared to sixty-three 
during the 1993 Term for Justice Ginsburg, who replaced him. See id. at 157–58. 
31. By my count.
32. By my count. The seventy-six cases with full opinions in the 2014 Term exceeded 
the total of sixty-eight cert. petitions granted in that term because some of these opinions 
resulted from cert. petitions granted toward the end of the 2013 Term. 
33. The total of 167 cases decided with full opinions in the 1981 Term is by my count.  
34. Adam Liptak, Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 17, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/18rulings.html. 
35. Id.
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THE SUPREME COURT—THEN AND NOW 9
Which Justice wrote the most opinions? In the 1957 Term, 
counting majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions, Justice 
Harlan led with thirty-five, closely followed by Justice Douglas 
with thirty-four, and Justice Frankfurter with thirty-one, 
although fourteen of the Douglas opinions were three pages or 
fewer.36 In the 2014 Term, Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Sotomayor were tied with twenty-eight opinions.37
By tradition, not rule, the votes of four Justices are 
sufficient to grant a request for review. Even when four Justices 
might vote to hear a case, they sometimes decline to do so 
because they anticipate that if the case is accepted for review, 
they will be out-voted five to four when the case is decided. The 
four might prefer to wait for a case presenting the same issue but 
with stronger facts supporting their side of the issue. Or, if there 
is a vacancy on the Court, the four might prefer to wait for the 
arrival of a fifth Justice who might vote for their side when the 
issue arises in a similar case. Occasionally, when there are only 
three votes in favor of granting review, another Justice will cast 
a so-called “courtesy vote,” on the theory that if three colleagues 
feel strongly that the case should be reviewed, that Justice 
should supply a fourth vote.38
The courts of 1957 and 2014 differ in a minor way with 
respect to the internal procedure for informing the staff about the 
disposition of cert. petitions reached at the weekly voting 
conference of the Justices. In 1957, after each conference, the 
Chief Justice called the clerk of the Court to his chambers and, 
with the Chief’s personal law clerks present, announced which 
petitions had been granted and which had been denied. 
Sometime after 1957, the junior Justice was assigned the task of 
reporting cert. grants and denials to the clerk of the Court and a 
few other members of the Court’s staff. 
The earlier practice led to one bizarre occurrence during my 
clerkship. A prisoner named Harold Rogers, sentenced to death 
for murder, sought review of a decision limiting the authority of 
a district court to hear new evidence in a habeas corpus 
proceeding he had brought, claiming that his state court 
36. By my count.  
37. By my count.  
38. See David M. O’Brien, Join-3 Votes, The Rule of Four, the Cert. Pool, and the 
Supreme Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 13 J.L. & POL. 779, 798 (1997). 
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10 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
conviction violated his constitutional rights. I recommended to 
the Chief Justice that the Court grant Rogers’s cert. petition, and 
he seemed inclined to do so. When Warren reported the cert. 
orders to the Court Clerk, however, he said that Rogers’s 
petition had been denied. As soon as the Clerk left, I reminded 
the Chief Justice that this was a petition he favored granting. 
“Oh, yes,” he said, “I think Felix suggested we just add some 
extra language to the denial order.” 
Warren telephoned Frankfurter, wrote out the words 
Frankfurter wanted added, and silently showed them to me with 
the phone still at his ear. The words explained that the Court 
understood the court of appeals to have ruled that the habeas 
corpus judge could generally accept the state court’s findings, 
but said nothing about hearing new evidence. I thought the 
words were inadequate because Rogers wanted the federal judge 
to hear new evidence that his confession had been coerced. With 
just seconds to keep the case (and Rogers) alive, I scribbled the 
added words “and may take testimony.” Warren read my words 
to Frankfurter who, for some reason I never understood (or 
asked about), agreed to them. That is how an order was issued 
stating that certiorari had been denied because the Supreme 
Court understood the court of appeals to have said exactly the 
opposite of what it had really said.39
The outcome provoked three law review articles 
commenting on the Supreme Court’s aberrational procedure of 
reversing while denying certiorari.40 The case continued before 
an understandably perplexed district court judge and later came 
back to the Supreme Court, which ruled on the merits that the 
confession had been coerced.41 Ultimately, the state permitted 
Rogers to avoid the death penalty, and he was eventually 
paroled.
The two Courts differ on when they filed their opinions. 
The 1957 Court followed the earlier practice of filing all 
39. Rogers v. Richmond, 357 U.S. 220, 220 (1957). 
40. Note, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Convictions: An Interplay of 
Appellate Ambiguity and District Court Discretion, 68 YALE L.J. 98, 108 (1958); Ernest J. 
Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, Foreword: Process of Law, 72 HARV. L. REV. 77, 
93 (1958); Recent Development, Supreme Court Scuttles Attempt to Limit Discretion of 
District Court to Hold Hearing De Novo in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Brought by State 
Prisoners, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 895, 899 (1958). 
41. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). 
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THE SUPREME COURT—THEN AND NOW 11
opinions only on a Monday. That practice changed in 1965, 
when the Court began to file opinions on two days of some 
weeks, especially in the final weeks of the Court’s term. The 
2014 Court continued the modern practice. 
I can take some slight credit for that change. During my 
year as a law clerk at the Court, the Supreme Court reporter for 
the New York Times was Anthony Lewis, then the Nation’s best 
journalist covering the Court, a tradition later continued for the 
Times by Linda Greenhouse and now by Adam Liptak. Tony 
Lewis and I discussed the problems created for the press by the 
Court’s habit of filing many important opinions in late June only 
on a Monday. 
I broached the matter to Chief Justice Warren, who was 
receptive to adding opinion-filing days and suggested the idea to 
the Court. Justice Frankfurter was strongly opposed. Hearing of 
his opposition, I had the temerity to suggest to him that more 
than one opinion day a week would help the press explain the 
Court’s work to the public. He told me that was none of the 
Court’s business. Soon after he died in 1965, the Court 
abandoned the Monday-only filing of opinions.42
The Court’s communication with the public has 
significantly changed. Before 1954, oral arguments were not 
recorded. During the 1954 Term, the future Chief Justice, 
Warren Burger, argued a case43 for the Government in his 
capacity as an Assistant Attorney General. A dispute arose as to 
whether he had made a concession during his argument. As a 
result of that controversy, Chief Justice Warren ordered all oral 
arguments to be recorded.44 However, for several years those 
recordings were not made available to the public. Only the 
Justices and their law clerks could hear them. In later years, 
researchers could hear them at the National Archives. Still later, 
the Court made recordings from one term available to the public 
at the beginning of the next term. Then, starting in 2010, the 
42. See Jon O. Newman, Opinion Days in the Supreme Court, XXXVI S. CT. HIST.
SOC’Y QUARTERLY 7, 7 (2014) (noting that “[b]eginning with the 1971 Term, the Court 
abandoned Mondays . . . for the normal release of written opinions in argued cases”). 
43. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); see also Newman, supra note 42, at 7.  
44. Argument Audio, SUP. CT. OF THE U.S. (n.d.), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_audio/2018 (noting that the Court’s recording of oral arguments 
began in 1955).  
40768-aap_19-1 Sheet No. 10 Side B      11/20/2018   11:50:28
40768-aap_19-1 Sheet No. 10 Side B      11/20/2018   11:50:28
NEWMANRESEND1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/9/2018 3:19 PM 
12 THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
Court made the recordings available to the public at the end of 
each argument week. And in 2013 recordings going back to 
1955 were digitized and made available to the public through an 
online archive. Starting with the 2006 Term, transcripts of oral 
arguments have been released within hours of each argument.45
The Court’s increased willingness to let the public hear the 
oral arguments stands in sharp contrast to its adamant refusal to 
let the public see the arguments via television. The Justices have 
advanced several reasons against televised arguments. Some of 
them have expressed concern about becoming more 
recognizable and increasing security risks.46 Others have said 
that the public will get a distorted view of how the Court 
functions, both because oral argument is only part of the process 
of presenting cases to the Court and because television stations 
will air only snippets from an hour-long argument.47 Concern 
has also been expressed that some Justices would be tempted to 
grandstand for the viewing public.48
I think none of these arguments has sufficient validity to 
outweigh the enormous public benefit of letting the public see 
oral arguments. I agree there would be increased recognition, 
but many Justices already show up frequently in televised 
interviews, and, even without live television, their photos are 
flashed on the screen while a reporter recounts some of the more 
interesting exchanges. It is likely that most newscasts would air 
only snippets, but the print media now inform the public only of 
small portions of arguments, and public understanding has not 
thereby suffered. As for the risk of grandstanding, my guess is 
that television cameras would have the opposite effect. Justices 
45. See SHAPIRO ET AL., supra note 3, at 787. 
46. See, e.g., Edward L. Carter, Supreme Court Oral Argument Video: A Review of 
Media Effects Research and Suggestions for Study, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 1719, 1727 
(reporting that Justice Thomas believes that “security issues” are “foremost” in Justices’ 
minds, and that “they would certainly become even more significant with more exposure” 
(footnote omitted)). 
47. See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View 
from the Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 97 (2006) (explaining that “oral 
argument comprises only one small portion of an entire case,” and expressing fear that 
those watching an oral-argument broadcast might “incorrectly believe that they are 
witnessing the process in its entirety”). 
48. Chief Justice Roberts is among those who have raised this possibility. See, e.g.,
Carter, supra note 46, at 1724 (referring to concerns about “possible ‘grandstanding’ by 
lawyers and Justices” expressed by Chief Justice Roberts (footnote omitted)). 
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would be less inclined to provoke laughter, either at the expense 
of counsel or even their colleagues. Thirty-five state supreme 
courts regularly live stream or televise oral arguments, with no 
adverse effects.49
The benefit would be significant. I would not predict high 
ratings for a typical Supreme Court oral argument, but interested 
viewers would come to appreciate that the Justices are engaged 
in the serious enterprise of probing to understand the lawyers’ 
arguments and discussing the issues among themselves on the 
bench before their private voting conference. C-SPAN could be 
expected to air oral arguments in full, at least in major cases, and 
even a chance to see excerpts would have great educational 
value.
The conduct of oral arguments has changed since the 1957 
Term. The Court then allowed each side one hour for argument, 
except for cases placed on the summary calendar, for which 
each side was allowed a half hour.50 By 2014 the Court had 
changed its rules to allow a half hour for all cases.51 However, 
the Court has allowed extended argument time for some major 
cases. For example, the case challenging the Affordable Care 
Act was argued for six hours over a three-day period.52 The 
modern practice stands in sharp contrast to the Court’s earliest 
decades when there were no time limits on oral arguments, 
which sometimes lasted for several days.53 Lengthy written 
briefs were then unknown. 
More significant than the change in time for oral arguments 
is the change in the extent of the Justices’ participation. A recent 
study meticulously counted and analyzed the number of words 
spoken by the Justices and by counsel in arguments during years 
shortly after the 1957 Term and shortly before the 2014 Term. 
The results are startling. In the earlier years’ arguments, counsel 
frequently began with long uninterrupted statements, some 
running hundreds of words, and, after a brief question or two, 
49. See Edwin Chemerinsky & Eric J. Segall, Cameras Belong in the Supreme Court,
101 JUDICATURE 14, 14 (Summer 2017). 
50. See Sup. Ct. R. 44(3) (1954). 
51. See Sup. Ct. R. 28(3) (2007). 
52. Order Allocating Oral Argument Time, Natl. Fed’n of Indep. Business v. Sibelius,
565 U.S. 1193 (Feb. 21, 2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-400).
53. See Sullivan & Canty, supra note 17, at 1021. 
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continued with more long uninterrupted statements. In 1961 one 
lawyer even gave his entire argument for more than half an hour 
without interruption.54 However, in the later years’ arguments, 
the authors of the study report, “[t]here were few cases in which 
counsel was able to say more than a sentence or two before 
being interrupted.”55 On average in the earlier years, the Justices 
spoke only about one-fourth as many words as counsel did.56 In 
the later years’ argument, the Justices spoke nearly two-thirds as 
many words as counsel did.57 And, in the more recent 
arguments, the Justices frequently interrupted each other and 
asked several questions in a row before counsel could answer 
the first one.58
Both the 1957 and 2014 Courts have continued the practice 
of filing all the Term’s opinions in argued cases before the Court 
adjourns for the summer. On the Court’s last day, the Chief 
Justice states, “All cases submitted to the Court for decision 
which were ready for disposition have been acted upon by the 
Court”59 or a variation of that phrasing.60 That phrase “ready for 
disposition” can obscure an interesting maneuver. If the Court is 
not ready at the end of the Term in June to file a major opinion 
in a case that has been argued, the case is set for re-argument at 
the beginning of the next Term in October, and an order is 
entered to that effect. 
That rarely happens, but occurred at least once to very good 
effect. In June 1953, the Court was not ready to file opinions in 
the historic school-desegregation cases. At that time, the Court 
was divided on the outcome. It has been widely reported, based 
on the Justices’ papers, that Justice Frankfurter urged 
re-argument for the specific purpose of gaining support for the 
54. See id. at 1052 & n.185 (noting that Robert L. Stern, then First Assistant Solicitor 
General, spoke 4,343 words without interruption in just under thirty-five minutes in United
States v. du Pont, 366 U.S. 316 (1961)). 
55. Id. at 1056–57. 
56. See id. at 1052 & n.45. 
57. See id.at 1052, 1043 n.124 (explaining methodology). 
58. See id. at 1068–71. 
59. See, e.g., J. SUP. CT. U.S. 780 (Statement of Chief Justice Burger) (July 2, 1981).
60.  Before the summer recess in 1994, Chief Justice Rehnquist said, “I am authorized 
to announce that all cases submitted to the Court have been acted upon by the Court. . . . 
Accordingly, it is ordered that those cases remaining on the docket, but not ready for 
consideration, are continued to the next session of the Court beginning October 3, 
1994 . . . .” Id. at 989 (June 30, 1994). 
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THE SUPREME COURT—THEN AND NOW 15
eventual ruling. The Court ordered re-argument and asked for 
briefing on five detailed questions.61
The delay had a significant consequence that affected the 
outcome. During the summer, Chief Justice Vinson, who was 
not prepared to rule segregated schools unconstitutional, died. 
After re-argument in December 1953, the new Chief Justice, 
Earl Warren, persuaded the recalcitrant Justices to reject the 
separate-but-equal doctrine, and he then wrote the historic 
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education,62 which was filed in 
May 1954. The decision would not have been unanimous had 
the case been decided in June 1953.63
The Court’s normal practice of filing all opinions before 
the summer recess has one unfortunate consequence. In the rush 
to file all opinions before the Term ends, the Court occasionally 
permits some ill-advised language to remain in some opinions. 
All thirteen federal courts of appeals file opinions during 
the summer months, and I believe all the state supreme courts 
also do so. I suppose there is some slight virtue in assuring the 
Justices a three-month restful summer uninterrupted by refining 
two or three opinions not quite ready for filing in June, but I 
think a slight interruption of a three-month vacation would be 
tolerable. With modern technology, the Justices could easily 
exchange views for finalizing opinions without re-assembling in 
Washington. Indeed, the Court on rare occasions has reconvened 
during the summer recess to hear and quickly resolve emergency 
matters. 
There are two well-known examples. On June 15, 1953, 
after announcing a recess,64 the Court considered the application 
filed by Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to obtain a last-minute writ 
of habeas corpus to avoid execution and denied it the same 
day.65 On June 24, 1971, the Court heard arguments in the 
61.  See id. 236–37 (June 8, 1953). 
62.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
63.  Another famous case ordered to be re-argued was Roe v. Wade. See J. SUP. CT.
U.S. 695 (June 26, 1972) (noting that “No. 70-18. Jane Roe et al., appellants, v. Henry 
Wade” and 
“No. 70-40. Mary Doe et al., appellants, v. Arthur K. Bolton, as Attorney General of the 
State of Georgia, et al.” were among the cases “restored to the calendar for reargument”). 
64. See id. 255 (June 15, 1953). 
65. See id. 256 (June 15, 1953). The Court convened again on June 18, 1953, to 
consider the Attorney General’s application to vacate a stay of the Rosenbergs’ execution 
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Pentagon Papers cases and four days later permitted their 
publication.66
Since 1957, the Court has added significant staff. During 
the 1972 Term, the Court created the position of Legal Counsel 
to serve as the Court’s lawyer on institutional matters. The Legal 
Counsel, assisted by one staff counsel, gives advice on budget 
matters, questions of ethics, and suits against the Court, such as 
those arising from protests on the Court’s plaza. The Legal 
Counsel also serves as a career law clerk to all the Justices, 
preparing memos on petitions for rehearing, lawsuits brought by 
one state against another state, and special applications such a 
mandamus petitions and petitions for an original writs of habeas 
corpus.
A more significant position, also created in 1972, is 
Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice,67 retitled in 2008 
as Counselor to the Chief Justice.68 That officer assists the Chief 
Justice in a variety of administrative tasks. 
The membership of the 1957 Court bears one striking 
resemblance to the membership of the 2014 Court. Both Courts 
had a four-member liberal wing, a four-member conservative 
wing, and one Justice in the middle. The liberals in 1957 were 
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan. 
The conservatives were Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and 
Harlan. The man often in the middle was Justice Whittaker. I 
need not remind readers of this journal of the names of the four 
liberals, the four conservatives, and often the swing voter on the 
2014 Court.
granted by Justice Douglas, see id. 257 (June 18, 1953), and vacated the stay the following 
day, see id. 258–59 (June 19, 1953). 
66. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Other significant cases 
argued and decided after the Court began a summer recess are Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 
(1942) (cert. granted July 29, 1942, decided July 31, 1942), and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 
1 (1958) (cert. granted Sept. 11, 1958, decided Sept. 12, 1958 (making “prompt 
announcement of our judgment affirming the Court of Appeals,” and explaining that “[t]he 
expression of the views supporting our judgment will be prepared and announced in due 
course”) & Sept. 29, 1958 (pointing out that the Court had “unanimously affirmed the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit” on September 12, 1958, and that 
it had “immediately issued the judgment, reserving the expression of [the Justices’] 
supporting views to a later date,” and explaining that “[t]his opinion of all of the members 
of the Court embodies those views” )). 
67. See Pub. L. No. 92-238, § 1, 86 Stat. 46 (1972).  
68. See Pub. L No. 110-402 § 1(b)(3)(A), 122 Stat. 4254 (2008), codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 677. 
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I do not mean to leave the impression that either Court 
routinely divided along liberal and conservative lines. They did 
not. Indeed, of the 117 opinions of the 1957 Court, twenty-eight 
were unanimous.69 And of the seventy-six opinions of the 2014 
Court, again twenty-eight were unanimous.70 But both Courts 
issued a number of five-to-four decisions, twenty out of 117 in 
1957, and nineteen out of seventy-six in 2014.71 When both 
Courts divided five to four, the liberal and conservative blocs 
were often—but not always—intact. Some unusual voting 
alignments occasionally occurred. In the 1957 Term, the 
members of the five-member majority affirming one conviction 
were Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Clark, Burton, 
and Whittaker.72 In 2014, the members of two five-member 
majorities were Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.73 But in most important five-
to-four decisions, the blocs were usually intact, and the swing 
voter determined the outcome. 
Two five-to-four decisions of the 1957 Term raised the 
most fundamental issues considered that Term. They both 
concerned the power of Congress to take citizenship away from 
a native-born citizen.74 The cases were Perez v. Brownell75 and 
Trop v. Dulles.76 In surprising outcomes, the Court voted five to 
four in Perez to uphold a law removing citizenship from a 
native-born citizen for voting in a foreign election77 and, on the 
69. By my count. 
70. By my count.
71. By my count. 
72. United States v. Masciale, 356 U.S. 386 (1958).  
73. Yates v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015); Dart Cherokee Basin 
Operating Co. v. Owens, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014).  
74. This denationalization, sometimes called expatriation, should be distinguished from 
denaturalization, which is taking citizenship away from a person who acquired citizenship 
by becoming naturalized. A naturalized citizen can be denaturalized if the naturalization 
was unlawfully obtained. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451.  
75. 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).  
76. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).  
77. The majority in Perez ruled that the statute was “reasonably related,” 356 U.S. at 
58, to the power of the National Government to “regulate foreign affairs,” id., because the 
act of voting in a foreign election was “potentially embarrassing to the American 
Government and pregnant with the possibility of embroiling this country in disputes with 
other nations,” id. at 60. Chief Justice Warren’s dissent started by considering the nature of 
citizenship. “Citizenship is man’s basic right for it is nothing less than the right to have 
rights.” Id. at 64 (Warren, C.J., Black & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
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very same day, voted five to four in Trop to declare 
unconstitutional a law imposing loss of citizenship as a 
punishment for wartime desertion.78 In Perez the Court upheld 
the denationalization as a reasonable exercise of Congress’s 
implied power to regulate the Nation’s foreign affairs. But in 
Trop the Court invalidated the denationalization, ruling it a cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
In these two five-four decisions, Justice Brennan voted for 
both results, outcomes he acknowledged were “paradoxical.”79
But in many of the five-four cases in 1957 Justice Whittaker cast 
the key vote. 
Unlike the able Justice Kennedy, whose vote was decisive 
in many of the five-four decisions of 2014, Justice Whittaker 
was a jurist of modest accomplishments. He found the task 
overwhelming. When some of us told a Whittaker law clerk one 
day that their Justice looked nervous, the clerk replied, “You’d 
be nervous too if you were deciding every case in this building.” 
And, he added, “This Government was born of its citizens, it maintains itself in a 
continuing relationship with them, and, in my judgment, it is without power to sever the 
relationship that gives rise to its existence.” Id. He acknowledged that a citizen could 
renounce citizenship or forfeit citizenship by performing some act that “compromise[s] his 
undivided allegiance to his country,” id. at 78, and that an act that interfered with the 
conduct of foreign affairs could be punished, but that citizenship could not be involuntarily 
taken away. Justice Douglas wrote an additional dissenting opinion, joined by Justice 
Black. See id. at 79. Justice Whittaker agreed with the majority that Congress could take 
citizenship away under its power to regulate foreign affairs, but dissented on the limited 
ground that the vote cast by Perez was lawful in Mexico, where he had voted, and therefore 
could not have caused any embarrassment with another country. See id. at 84. 
Although Chief Justice Warren’s view was rejected in the five-four decision that 
upheld the power of Congress to take citizenship away for voting in a foreign election, it 
was vindicated in 1957 when the Court abandoned Perez in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 
(1967). The Afroyim decision ruled five to four, largely on the basis of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, that Congress could not take citizenship away for voting in a foreign election. 
78. In a plurality opinion in Trop, joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker, 
Chief Justice Warren stated that taking away citizenship as punishment for the offense of 
desertion was cruel and unusual because it was “the total destruction of the individual’s 
status in organized society.” 356 U.S. at 101. Justice Brennan, who had voted in Perez to
uphold denationalization for voting in a foreign election, stated that taking away citizenship 
for desertion did not have “the requisite rational relation” to Congress’ war power. See id.
at 114 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter, in an opinion joined by Justices 
Burton, Clark, and Harlan, dissented on the ground that denationalization for desertion was 
a regulatory measure within Congress’ war power, see id. 118–22 (Frankfurter, Burton, 
Clark & Harlan, JJ., dissenting), and, even if viewed as a punishment, was not cruel and 
unusual within the meaning of the Eighth amendment, see id. at 125–28 (Frankfurter, 
Burton, Clark & Harlan, JJ., dissenting).
79.  Id. at 105 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
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The most interesting aspect of 1957’s swing voter was the 
way his vote was sought by the two blocs. No fair damsel was 
ever courted more assiduously. It was embarrassing. My favorite 
recollection concerns a particularly difficult case, Harmon v. 
Brucker.80 The question was whether the military could give a 
soldier a less-than-honorable discharge for misconduct occurring 
before he joined the armed forces. It was the Court’s practice to 
vote at a Friday conference on cases argued the previous four 
days. At the first voting conference after Harmon was argued, 
no votes were cast. The case remained undecided at the next two 
conferences. With no Justice voting even at the fourth 
conference, Justice Whittaker stunned the brethren by saying, 
“Chief, how about I try my hand at a draft?” 
Eight hypocritical voices, having no idea what Whittaker 
had in mind, chorused, “Charlie, that’s a great idea!” A few 
weeks later Whittaker circulated a draft opinion. It was just 
awful, poorly reasoned and poorly written. “What the hell is 
this?” we asked the Whittaker clerks. Their reply: “We’re seeing 
it for the first time, just as you are.” For several days no Justice 
said or wrote anything. They were all determined not to offend 
the object of their affection. 
Finally, Justice Frankfurter acted, and did so in an 
astonishing way. He took Whittaker’s draft opinion to the print 
shop in the Supreme Court building and had the opinion reset 
with triple spacing. Then, Frankfurter applied his pen to the 
Whittaker draft and, in the manner of a school teacher, crossed 
out all the wrong words and inserted words that made sense. 
Frankfurter circulated the revision to the entire Court. I could 
not believe he would so humiliate another Justice, but I was sure 
he was clueless about how his handiwork would be perceived—
by Whittaker and the other Justices. It was a failing of the 
brilliant Frankfurter that he could be so unintentionally tactless. 
The case was ultimately decided in an unsigned opinion, ruling 
that the discharge was invalid.81
As far as I am aware, the two blocs of the 2014 Court 
engaged in no similar courtship of Justice Kennedy. Indeed, the 
late Justice Scalia took just the opposite tack, going out of his 
80.  355 U.S. 579 (1958). 
81. Id. at 583. 
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way to use hostile language that was certain to drive Justice 
Kennedy away. In his dissent in the same-sex marriage case,82
Justice Scalia famously wrote, “[i]f . . . I ever joined an opinion 
for the Court that began [and here he quoted the first sentence 
from Justice Kennedy’s opinion], I would hide my head in a 
bag.”83 Justice Scalia managed to insult Justice Kennedy and all 
four Justices who had joined his opinion. 
Chief Justice Warren’s plurality opinion in Trop provides 
the basis for comparing the 1957 and 2014 Courts in two 
respects. The first stems from the well-known sentence in the 
Trop opinion interpreting the Eighth Amendment, a sentence 
frequently quoted in whole or in part in many later Supreme 
Court majority opinions, one as recently as March of 2017.84
Chief Justice Warren wrote: “The Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”85 That sentence from the 1957 
Term, declaring that the meaning of “cruel and unusual 
punishment” was not limited to its original meaning in 1787, 
prompted an extraordinary retort from Justice Scalia in the 2014 
Term. In his dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross,86 Justice 
Scalia said that the Trop case “has caused more mischief to our 
jurisprudence, to our federal system, and to our society than any 
other that comes to mind.”87
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion in Trop and Justice Scalia’s 
opinion in Glossip exemplify the fundamental divide between 
those who view the Constitution in some respects as a living 
82. Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).  
83. Id. at 2630 n.22 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). 
84. See, e.g., Moore v. Tex., ___ U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017); Brumfield v. 
Cain, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2274 (2015); Hall v. Fla., 572 U.S. 701, ___, 134 S. 
Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014); Miller v. Ala., 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012); Graham v. Fla., 560 U.S. 
48, 58 (2011). 
85. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
86. ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).  
87. Id. at 2749 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Although thus scorning Chief Justice 
Warren’s formulation in Trop that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” 356 U.S. at 
101, Justice Scalia had earlier acknowledged that “this Court has ‘not confined the 
prohibition embodied in the Eighth Amendment to “barbarous” methods that were 
generally outlawed in the 18th Century,’ but instead has interpreted the Amendment ‘in a 
flexible and dynamic manner.’” Stanford v. Ky., 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1986) (quoting Griggs 
v. Ga., 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976)). And, he added, “[O]ur job is to identify the ‘evolving 
standards of decency.’” Id. at 378 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (emphasis in original)).  
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document, adaptable to new conditions, and the so-called 
originalist view that the Constitution means today exactly what 
it meant in 1787 when it was adopted. I say the “so-called” 
originalist view because no originalist really believes that every 
clause of the Constitution means today exactly what it meant 
then. Of course, a person still has to be thirty-five to be eligible 
to become President,88 and every state still gets just two 
senators,89 but even Justice Scalia agreed that the Fourteenth 
Amendment should not be understood in the twentieth century 
to perpetuate the separate-but-equal doctrine of the nineteenth 
century.90 Another example: the Fourth Amendment prohibiting 
unreasonable searches originally meant that only searches 
conducted pursuant to so-called “general” warrants were 
prohibited,91 but Justice Scalia agreed with the modern Court 
that “unreasonable searches” now means any search where the 
state’s legitimate law enforcement needs do not outweigh the 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.92
Some clauses retain their original meaning. Some do not. 
Reasonable Justices can differ as to which are which. In 1957, 
there was little, if any, talk about originalism. Those critical of 
the Warren Court’s liberal decisions usually argued that the 
Court was not observing appropriate judicial restraint. 
Chief Justice Warren’s Trop opinion also reveals another 
difference between the Court’s view in the 1957 Term and 
Justice Scalia’s view in the 2014 Term. Chief Justice Warren 
surveyed the laws of the nations of the world, then numbering 
88. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
89. See id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
90. See, e.g., Ronald Turner, The Problematics of the Brown-is-Originalist Project, 23 
J. L. & POL’Y 591, 624–31(2015) (analyzing Justice Scalia’s apparent position on Brown).
91. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 547, 724 (1999) (characterizing the amendment’s text as “a specific response to a 
specific grievance that had arisen in a specific historical context,” and concluding that 
“[t]he Framers aimed the Fourth Amendment precisely at banning Congress from 
authorizing use of general warrants,” that “they did not mean to create any broad 
reasonableness standard for assessing warrantless searches and arrests,” and that “they did 
not intend [the amendment] to guide officers in the exercise of discretionary arrest or 
search authority”).  
92. The Supreme Court has said that the reasonableness of a search “is determined by 
weighing ‘the promotion of legitimate governmental interests’ against the degree to which 
[the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.’” Md. v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 
(2013) (quoting Wyo. v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).  
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eighty-four, and his opinion reported that only two used taking 
away citizenship as a punishment for desertion.93 Decades later, 
Scalia would argue vehemently that it is improper even to cite 
foreign law in interpreting our Constitution. What is noteworthy 
about Chief Justice Warren’s reference to foreign law in Trop is 
that not even the four dissenting Justices expressed the slightest 
concern that he had done so,94 nor did any contemporaneous 
commentary. Indeed, in a 2005 opinion, Roper v. Simmons,95
ruling that the death penalty could not be imposed on those 
under the age of eighteen at the time of their crime, Justice 
Kennedy pointed out that almost all other nations took the same 
position, and cited Chief Justice Warren’s reference to foreign 
law in Trop.96 In his Roper dissent, Justice Scalia said that the 
invocation of foreign law “should be rejected out of hand.”97
My final comparison of the Supreme Court then and now 
takes me back a few years before the 1957 Term to 1952 when 
the Court decided the Steel Seizure Case.98 That case is often 
recalled because of Justice Jackson’s well-known concurring 
opinion, which the 2014 Court discussed in the Zivotofsky
case.99 I consider that concurring opinion here because this 
article originated as my 2017 Robert H. Jackson Lecture on the 
Supreme Court.100
The Steel Seizure Case, as many remember, was a 
challenge to President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills on the 
eve of a nationwide strike. The litigation presented a major 
confrontation between the executive and legislative branches. In 
his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson divided Presidential 
power into three categories. In the first, the President acts 
pursuant to the authority of Congress. In that situation, said 
Jackson, the President’s power is at its maximum. In the second 
category, the President acts in the absence of any statute that 
93. The Philippines and Turkey. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 103.  
94. In fact, Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting opinion said that “[m]any civilized nations 
impose loss of citizenship for indulgence in designated prohibited activities.” Id. at 126 
(Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, & Harlan, JJ., dissenting) (citing a United Nations document). 
95. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  
96. See id. at 575.  
97. Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J., dissenting).  
98. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
99. Zivitofsky ex rel. Zivitofsky v. Kerry, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).  
100. Delivered at Chautauqua, N.Y., on August 16, 2017. 
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either authorizes or prohibits his action. In that situation, said 
Jackson, the President must rely on his own independent 
powers, but, he added, “there is a zone of twilight in which he 
and Congress may have concurrent authority.”101 In the third 
category, the President acts contrary to the will of Congress. In 
that situation, said Jackson, presidential power is “at its lowest 
ebb,”102 and he can rely “only upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter.”103 To succeed in this third category, Jackson added, the 
President’s power must be both “exclusive” and “conclusive” on 
the matter.104 Agreeing with the Court’s unanimous decision, he 
said that President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills was in the 
third category because it was in violation of an implied 
prohibition of Congress and unlawful because it was beyond any 
exclusive power of the President. 
The 2014 case, Zivotofsky, also presented a conflict 
between the executive and legislative branches. Menachem 
Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem. His mother asked the U.S. 
embassy to list Israel as her son’s place of birth on his U.S. 
passport. The embassy refused, relying on a State Department 
policy stating that, while the birthplace of a U.S. citizen born 
abroad could normally be recorded as the country having 
sovereignty over the city of birth, Menachem’s birthplace would 
be recorded as Jerusalem—not Israel—because the United 
States did not recognize any country as having sovereignty over 
that city. 
However, in a 2002 statute, Congress had included a 
provision that sought to overturn the State Department’s policy 
and permit births like Menachem’s to be listed on U.S. passports 
as occurring in Israel.105 The mother sued, invoking the 
Congressional enactment. 
A divided Supreme Court ruled the statutory provision 
unconstitutional because it was an impermissible encroachment 
on the exclusive power of the President to recognize foreign 
101. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).  
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.at 638.  
105. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, § 214(d), 116 Stat. 
1350 (2002).  
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states and their territorial boundaries. In reaching that decision, 
the Court invoked Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in the 
Steel Seizure Case.106
In Zivotofsky, as in the Steel Seizure Case, the Court placed 
the President’s action in Jackson’s third category because the 
President had again acted contrary to the will of Congress, but 
this time the Court upheld the President’s power.107 It ruled that 
his action was within the President’s exclusive recognition 
power and the act of Congress was therefore unconstitutional. 
 Justice Jackson’s much-cited three categories in the Steel
Seizure Case provide a useful framework for beginning analysis 
of presidential power, but I doubt that they get us very far. All 
cases in the first category, where the President acts in 
accordance with an act of Congress, are clear. Most close cases 
will arise in the second category, and Jackson told us nothing 
about the standards he would use for testing presidential action 
when Congress has neither authorized nor prohibited such 
action. Jackson’s third category, where Congress directly or 
impliedly prohibits presidential action, also provides little basis 
for determining outcomes as the opposite results in the Steel
Seizure and Zivitofsky cases, both in the third category, illustrate. 
If I may be permitted to express a minor heresy, I think Justice 
Jackson’s three-category analysis reveals somewhat less than 
meets the eye. 
I am much more enthusiastic about his most frequently 
quoted judicial sentence. In Brown v. Allen108 he wrote the best 
aphorism ever applied to the Supreme Court: “We are not final 
because we are infallible, but we are infallible because we are 
final.”109 So well said and so true—in the 1957 Term, the 2014 
Term, and, I can safely predict, in all future terms. 
106. Zivitofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083 (recognizing “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite 
framework”).  
107. Id. at 2090, 2096 (pointing out that “[t]he Executive is not free from the ordinary 
controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue” but holding 
that “Congress cannot command the President to contradict an earlier recognition 
determination in the issuance of passports”). 
108. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).  
109. Id. at 540 (Jackson, J., concurring in the result).  
